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Note
Can They Do That? The Due Process and Article III
Problems of Proposed Findings of Criminal
Contempt in Bankruptcy Court
Richard Murphy
The most careful note must often fail to convey the evidence fully in
some of its most important elements.... It cannot give the look or
manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his calmness or consideration;
... the dead body of the evidence, without its spirit; which is supplied,
when
given openly and orally, by the ear and eye of those who receive
1
it.
That contempt power... is capable of abuse is certain. Men who make

their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrow2

ness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which human flesh is heir.
Bankruptcy court contempt 3 authority lies at the intersection of two difficult bodies of law.4 Bankruptcy judges are non1. Queen v. Bertrand, 16 Eng. Rep. 391, 399 (1867) cited in United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1980).
2. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
3. See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text (discussing contempt

law).
4. Unsurprisingly, appellate courts divide on the validity of bankruptcy
court authority over various forms of contempt. For a discussion of criminal
contempt authority, see, e.g., Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174,
1178-79 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that bankruptcy courts may find a party guilty
of criminal contempt if their findings are subject to adequate district court review); In re Brown, 94 B.R. 526, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that bankruptcy courts may exercise non-core criminal contempt authority). But see
Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that bankruptcy courts lack statutory authorization to punish criminal contempts committed outside their presence and that such a grant of jurisdiction
would be constitutionally dubious); In re Lawrence, 1993 WL 590779, at *2
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack criminal contempt authority); Kellog v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 37-39 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that
grant of criminal contempt power to bankruptcy courts would be unconstitutional); In re Industrial Tool Distrib., 55 B.R. 746, 750 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (holding
that bankruptcy courts lack criminal contempt authority); Better Homes of Va.,
Inc. v. Budget Serv. Co. (In re Better Homes of Va., Inc.), 52 B.R. 426, 430 (E.D.
Va. 1985) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack criminal contempt authority).
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Article III officers. 5 Therefore, any analysis of their contempt
authority must consider both contempt law and the limitations
that Article III places on non-Article III tribunal authority. This
is not an easy task. Contempt law is a confusing mess.6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist has characterized Article III jurisprudence as
arcane distinctions and confusing
rife with "frequently
7
precedents."
Undeterred by the complex web of Article III and contempt
law, some bankruptcy judges have sought to punish persons for
criminal s contempt pursuant to their courts' non-core 9 authorFor discussions of the validity of civil contempt power in bankruptcy court,
see, e.g., Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,
448-49 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) grants bankruptcy
courts civil contempt power and that this jurisdictional grant is constitutional);
Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding
that Congress has authorized bankruptcy courts' civil contempt power and that
this authorization is not a violation of separation-of-powers); In re Dennig, 98
B.R. 935, 938-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that bankruptcy courts possess civil contempt powers); Kellog v. Chester, 71 B.R. 36, 37-39 (N.D. Tex.
1987) (holding that bankruptcy courts possess statutory authority to issue final
orders of civil contempt pursuant to their core powers); In re L.H. & A. Realty,
Inc., 62 B.R. 910, 912 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (holding that bankruptcy courts may
issue final orders of civil contempt under their core authority); In re Kalpana,
Inc., 58 B.R. 326, 335 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that bankruptcy courts
may exercise non-core authority over civil contempts). But see Plastiras v. Idell
(In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that Congress did not authorize bankruptcy court jurisdiction over civil
contempts).
5. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text (explaining bankruptcy
judges' non-Article III status).
6. Describing the labyrinths of contempt law, one commentator wrote:
In legal literature, it [contempt] has been categorized, subclassified,
and scholastically dignified by division into varying shades-each covering some particular aspect of the general power, respectively governed by a particular set of procedures. So, the texts separate
retributive or criminal contempts from merely coercive or civil contempts; those directly offensive from those only constructively contemptuous; those affecting the judiciary and others the legislature.
RONALD GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
7. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,
90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
8. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (distinguishing criminal from civil contempt). This Note examines only criminal contempt, not civil
contempt. For a discussion of the constitutional issues bankruptcy court civil
contempt powers raise, see generally William S. Parkinson, The Contempt
Power of the Bankruptcy CourtFact or Fiction: The Debate Continues, 65 AMER.
BANKR. L.J. 591, 597-623 (1991) (suggesting in the context of a discussion
largely devoted to civil contempt that bankruptcy courts certify facts of contempt rather than independently hear or determine contempts); Richard C.
Howard, Comment, Contempt Power and the Bankruptcy Courts: The New
Trend, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 335 (1989) (discussing both civil and criminal con-
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ity.10 Generally, when a bankruptcy court acts in its non-core
capacity, it issues "proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law." 1 These proposed findings of criminal contempt, however,
pose difficult jurisdictional and procedural problems. The jurisdictional problems stem from the bankruptcy judges' non-Article
III status. 1 2 Bankruptcy court proceedings that purport to decide criminal liability may impermissibly encroach on the Article III courts' control of "judicial power." 13 The procedural
problems, which stem from the structure of district court review
of bankruptcy court proposed findings, implicate principles of
due process. 14 The district courts may confine review to de novo
determination on the written records.' 5 This practice arguably
allows a court to violate the defendant's due process right that

tempt); Jon C. Sogn, Comment, In re Krisle: Civil Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 31 S.D. L. REv. 273 (1986) (suggesting that bankruptcy courts
exercise civil contempt powers despite constitutional concerns); see also infra
note 57 (discussing how some of the constitutional issues relating to criminal
contempt do not necessarily apply to civil contempt).
9. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy
court non-core authority).
10. See, e.g., Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1504 (5th Cir.
1990) (criticizing an unpublished bankruptcy court proposed finding of criminal
contempt); Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 140 B.R. 889, 891 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1992) (holding an attorney in criminal contempt of bankruptcy court); see also
Moratzka v. Visa U.S.A. (In re Calstar, Inc.), 159 B.R. 247, 260-61 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1993) (asserting the power of the bankruptcy court to punish violation of
bankruptcy court orders and automatic stays).
11. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy
court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and the standard of review that district courts apply to these findings). For ease of expression, this
Note will refer to bankruptcy court "proposed findings and conclusions of law"
simply as "proposed findings."
12. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy
judges' non-Article III status and limits on non-Article III tribunal authority).
13. See infra notes 155-165 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 142-145.
15. See infra note 40 (discussing the district court standard of review for
bankruptcy court proposed findings). The standard of review for magistrate
judge findings on dispositive pretrial matters permits the district court to confine review to written records. See infra note 51 (discussing the district court
standard ofreview on magistrate dispositive findings). The magistrate statutes
refer to this standard of review as "de novo determination." 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (1988). The bankruptcy statutes and rules do not use the phrase "de
novo determination" but adopt a functionally equivalent standard of review.
See infra note 40; 11 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988); BANxR. R. 9033. Therefore, for
ease of expression, this Note will at times refer to the standard of review for
bankruptcy proposed findings as "de novo determination."
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criminal liability hear the credibilitythe judge who 1decides
6
based evidence.
This Note focuses on the constitutionality of bankruptcy
court proposed findings of criminal contempt. Part I discusses
the authority of bankruptcy courts, paying particular attention
to their power to issue proposed findings and comparing this
power to that of magistrate judges. It then discusses the constitutional limits on non-Article III resolution of criminal liability.
In addition, Part I provides a brief overview of the law of contempt. Part II examines two recent appellate opinions that
reached contrary conclusions on the validity of bankruptcy court
criminal contempt proceedings: In re Ragar17 and In re Hipp.'8
Part III analyzes existing law and concludes that bankruptcy
court proposed findings of criminal contempt violate due process
and Article III.19 In the alternative, these findings are, at the
very least, sufficiently problematic that courts should practice
"constitutional avoidance" 20 and interpret the bankruptcy statutes to deny bankruptcy courts this authority. Part III concludes with a straightforward solution to the problem: require
bankruptcy judges, like their magistrate judge colleagues, to
certify2 x the facts of criminal contempt for a full district court de
novo hearing 2 2rather than for a less stringent de novo
determination.
I. BANKRUPTCY AND MAGISTRATE AUTHORITY TO
ISSUE "PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW"
The determination of whether bankruptcy courts have authority to issue proposed findings of contempt requires analysis
16. See infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the right to a
hearing before the judge who determines guilt).
17. Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174 (8th Cir. 1993).
18. Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990).
19. For futher discussion of the validity of bankruptcy court contempt authority see generally Parkinson, supra note 8 (criticizing bankruptcy court contempt authority). Contra Howard, supra note 8 (concluding that bankruptcy
courts enjoy both civil & criminal contempt authority). See also Sogn, supra
note 8 (concluding that bankruptcy courts possess contempt authority).
20. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the "canon of constitutional avoidance").
21. See infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing statutory authority of magistrate judges to certify the facts of contempt for district court hearing); see also Parkinson, supra note 8, at 618, 622 (suggesting that bankruptcy
courts should certify the facts of contempt).
22. See supra note 15 (discussing use of the phrase "de novo determination"
in this Note).
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of several bodies of law. Examination of the Bankruptcy Code
and its outline of non-core authority is necessary. In addition,
comparison of bankruptcy and magistrate authority is helpful to
illuminate the limits on non-Article III tribunal authority generally. Also, one must examine the Article III and due process concerns that proposed findings of criminal contempt raise. Finally,
examination of the idiosyncratic nature of contempt law is
necessary.
A.

BANKRUPTcY COURT AUTHORITY OVER NON-CORE IssuEs

Bankruptcy courts are a hybrid of two forms of non-Article
III tribunal, 2 3 the legislative court and the adjunct. 24 Congress
25
may create legislative courts to adjudicate "public rights."
These courts are constitutional because Congress creates public
26
rights by statute and possesses plenary authority over them.
Because Congress is free to create, destroy, or alter public
rights, it may also entrust their adjudication to legislative courts
without undermining the Article Ill courts' judicial power. 2 7 By
contrast, adjuncts cannot undermine the Article III courts' judi23. '1he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 1. Bankruptcy judges serve 14 year
terms. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Congress may diminish the salaries of the bankruptcy judges during their terms of office. 28 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
24. Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1288
n.10 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing "hybrid" nature of the bankruptcy courts).
25. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50, 68-70 (1982) (plurality) (describing congressional authority to create
legislative courts in light of the "public rights" doctrine). The Supreme Court
arguably called the continuing vitality of the public rights doctrine into question when it ruled that a non-Article I tribunal could adjudicate permissive
common law counterclaims pendent to claims that commodities customers
brought against their brokers. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (characterizing the Commission's jurisdiction as a de
minimis invasion of the Article I courts' power). Three years later, however,
the Court relied heavily on the public rights doctrine in Granfinancieras, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (holding that Congress may only commit to
non-Article HI tribunals the adjudication of statutory rights "closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has the power to enact" or
rights that belong to or exist against the federal government).
26. See, e.g., Granfinancieras,492 U.S. at 54 (discussing Congress's ability
to create statutory public rights and then assign their adjudication to administrative agencies).
27. Id.
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28 Adcial power because the Article III courts control 2them.
9
judges.
III
juncts serve as assistants to the Article
A bankruptcy court's power to resolve a given issue depends
on whether it falls under the court's "core" or "non-core" authority.3 0 Bankruptcy courts act as legislative courts and conclusively determine core issues, which involve the restructuring of
creditor/debtor relations. 3 1 Because Congress has plenary authority over bankruptcy, 32 creditor/debtor relations arguably involve "public rights."3 3 Thus, when exercising core jurisdiction,

28. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (holding that Article III judges' thorough-going control of
magistrate judges renders Congress's grant of power to the magistrate judges
constitutional), cited with approvalin Peretz v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 2661,
2670 (1991) (adopting Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Raddatz for
purposes of determining whether a grant of power to an adjunct violates Article
III).
29. See, e.g., Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain
functions to competent and impartial assistants [the magistrate judges], while
ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the assistants' activities.").
30. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (stating bankruptcy court jurisdiction and dividing that jurisdiction into core and non-core areas of authority).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988). This statute defines core jurisdiction and
states in part:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests
for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title
11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated
personal tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes
of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate;...
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security
holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
33. At least Congress hoped this was the case. Current bankruptcy statutes represent Congress's reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In this
landmark case, a plurality of the Supreme Court overturned Congress's 1978
reorganization of the bankruptcy courts on the grounds that Congress's actions
encroached on the Article I courts' judicial power. Id. at 87. Congress had
granted the bankruptcy courts all of the "powers of a court of equity, law and
admiralty," The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2671
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1978)) (repealed 1984) [hereinafter 1978 Act], except that they could not "enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not
committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment
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bankruptcy courts may constitutionally act as legislative
34

courts.

The Bankruptcy Code also authorizes bankruptcy courts to
hear proceedings that are not core but are "otherwise related" to
a case under Title 11.3 5 They may determine non-core issues
only with the consent of the parties.3 6 Barring consent, bankruptcy courts may only make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on non-core matters.3 7 When they issue these
recommendations, bankruptcy judges act, like magistrate
judges, as "adjuncts" or assistants of the district courts.38
After the bankruptcy court issues a proposed finding under
its non-core authority, the parties may file written objections
within ten days pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9033.39 If one or
of imprisonment." Id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1481) (repealed 1984). The Court
ruled that this grant of power enabled bankruptcy courts to decide issues of
"private right." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84. Thus, it encroached on the
judiciary's Article III power. Id.
Congress responded in 1984 with amendments to the 1978 Act. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (codified at 11 and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1984 Act]. The amendments divided bankruptcy court jurisdiction into "core" and "non-core" areas.
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). Congress authorized the bankruptcy courts to continue to conclusively determine core cases which involve the restructuring of
creditor/debtor relations. Id. § 157(b). Congress must have believed, therefore,
that core issues (those involving the restructuring of creditor/debtor relations)
were a matter of public right. Otherwise, in light of the NorthernPipeline holding, bankruptcy court determination of core matters would continue to usurp
the Article III courts' judicial power. See Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto
Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the 1984
amendments as a response to Northern Pipeline).
Despite Congress's best efforts, however, evidence exists that the restructuring of creditor/debtor relations is not a matter of public right. Justice Brennan wrote in Granfinanieras,"[w]e do not suggest that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations is in fact a public right. This thesis has met with substantial scholarly criticism." 492 U.S. at 56 n.11. If restructuring is not a public right, then bankruptcy courts may still act unconstitutionally when they
determine core matters.
34. Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1288 n.10 (describing bankruptcy court core fimctions as like those of a legislative court).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988) ("A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under
title 11.").
36. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988).
37. Id. § 157(c)(1).
38. See, e.g., Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1288 n.10 (discussing the hybrid legislative court/adjunct nature of bankruptcy courts).
39. BANKRUzIcY RuLE 9033(b) provides:
Objections: time for filing. Within 10 days after being served with a
copy of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law a party may
serve and file with the clerk written objections which identify the spe-
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more of the parties file objections, the district court reviews de
novo the objections and the portions of the record to which the
parties have objected. 4 0 The district court retains complete discretion to take further evidence, conduct hearings, or confine review to written records. 4 1 Significantly, district courts use
magistrate judge findings on disidentical procedures to review
42
positive pretrial motions.

cific proposed findings or conclusions objected to and state the grounds
for such objection. A party may respond to another party's objections
within 10 days after being served with a copy thereof. A party objecting to the bankruptcyjudge's proposed findings or conclusions shall
arrange promptly for the transcription of the record, or such portions of
it as all parties may agree upon or the bankruptcy judge deems sufficient, unless the district judge otherwise directs.
BANKR. R. 9033(b).
40. The bankruptcy statute describes district court review of non-core matters generally as "de novo":
In such [a non-core] proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,
and any final order of judgment shall be entered by the district judge
after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has
timely and specifically objected.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). Bankruptcy Rule 9033(d) introduces the notion that district courts may confine de novo review to the written records:
Standard of review. The district judge shall make a de novo review
upon the record or, after additional evidence, of any portion of the
bankruptcy judge's findings of fact or conclusions of law to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The
district judge may accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings of fact
or conclusions of law, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter
to the bankruptcy judge with instructions.
BANKE. R. 9033(d) (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee Notes immediately following the rule observe that this rule is an adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b).
The district judge need only review a bankruptcy finding of contempt if a
party requests review. After a party makes such a request, the district court
may confine its review to the written records. The district judge enjoys complete discretion whether or not to hear any evidence at all. This standard is
identical to the "de novo determination" standard that district courts apply
when they review magistrate proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on
dispositive pretrial motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See infra note 51
(discussing "de novo determination" standard of review).
41. BANKR. R. 9033(d) (describing the standard of review that district
courts use to examine bankruptcy court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law).
42. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing district court
review of magistrate judge findings).
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COMPARISON OF BANKRupTcy COURT AUTHORITY OVER

NON-CORE ISSUES WITH MAGISTRATE COURT
AUTHORITY OVER DIsPOsITIVE PRE-TRIAL

MATTERS AND CONTEMPTS
As the primary example of district court adjuncts, 43 the limits on the authority of magistrate judges illuminate the limits on
the authority of bankruptcy judges acting in their adjunct, or
44
non-core, capacity. Although they are non-Article III officers,
magistrate judges may perform a variety of ministerial and adjudicative tasks for Article III courts. 4 5 For example, with both
district court referral and consent of the parties, magistrate
judges may conduct bench and jury trials for all civil disputes
and misdemeanors. 4 6 They may also determine most pretrial
matters subject to district court review7 under the "clearly erro4
neous and contrary to law" standard.
For "dispositive" pretrial matters,48 however, magistrates
may only recommend "proposed findings of fact" to the district
court. 49 If a party makes a timely objection to a proposed dispositive pretrial finding, the district court must review the proposed finding under the "de novo determination" standard. 50
"De novo determination" permits the district judge to confine review to written records. 5 ' District courts therefore apply the
43. Magistrates are "competent and impartial assistants" under the "complete supervisory control" of the district courts. United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 686 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. Full-time magistrate judges serve eight year terms. Part-time magistrate judges serve four year terms. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1988). See supra note 23
(stating the requirements for Article III judge status).
45. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
46. Id. § 636(c)(1).
47. Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
48. Dispositive pretrial motions include motions:
[Flor injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by
the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to
permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an
action.

Id.
49. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
50. Id. § 636(b)(1).
51. § 636(b)(1) states the standard of review for magistrate court proposed
findings and recommendations:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
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pretrial
same standard of review to both magistrate dispositive
52
findings and to bankruptcy court proposed findings.
Magistrate judges may not, however, make proposed findings of contempt pursuant to their authority over dispositive
pretrial motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Instead, magistrate judges must certify the facts of contempt pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(e).5 3 The district court then reviews the certified
facts in a de novo hearing54 rather than under the less strict de
novo determination standard that district courts apply to proposed findings on dispositive pretrial motions. 55
In contrast, the statute stating bankruptcy court jurisdic56
tional authority appears to be silent on the issue of contempt.
Some bankruptcy judges have interpreted this silence as an implicit grant of the power to issue proposed findings of criminal
contempt under their non-core authority5 7 to hear proceedings
the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.
§ 636(b)(1) (1988). In United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court clarified the
de novo determination standard, distinguishing de novo determinations from de
novo hearings. 447 U.S. 667, 673-76 (1980). A court may confine de novo determinations to written records. Id. at 675. De novo hearings require that the
district court actually hear the evidence. Id. at 673-74.
52. See supra note 40 (discussing the statutes and rules governing district
court review of bankruptcy court non-core findings). Although the Bankruptcy
Code does not use the phrase, this Note will refer to district court review ofboth
bankruptcy and magistrate findings as "de novo determination."
53. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) states:
Upon the commission of any such [contemptuous] act or conduct, the
magistrate shall forthwith certify the facts to a judge of the district
court and may serve or cause to be served upon any person whose behavior is brought into question under this section an order requiring
such person to appear before ajudge of that court upon a day certain to
show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt by reason of
the facts so certified. A judge of the district court shall thereupon, in a
summary manner, hear the evidence as to the act or conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, punish such
person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt
committed before a judge of the court....
28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. See supra note 51 (discussing "de novo determination" and the
Supreme Court ruling in Raddatz that district courts may confine de novo determination review to written records).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (1988) (stating bankruptcy court non-core authority).
57. Bankruptcy courts only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law pursuant to their non-core authority. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). Any bankruptcy judge who submits a proposed finding of criminal contempt, therefore,
must claim, implicitly or explicitly, that the power to hear criminal contempt
proceedings comprises part of their non-core authority. See, e.g., Brown v. Ram-
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related to a case under Title 11.58 Indeed, Bankruptcy Rule
9020, although it does not purport to grant contempt powers,
buttresses this conclusion by providing non-core procedures for
say (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1993); see infra note 119 (discussing proposed findings of criminal contempt as assertions of non-core authority).
Bankruptcy courts probably lack core criminal contempt authority. Core
proceedings include cases under Title 11 and those that arise in Title 11 cases.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Courts punish criminal contempt to vindicate their authority. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911). Criminal
contempt proceedings may therefore continue even after dismissal of the underlying suit which gave rise to the alleged contempt. Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp,
Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1517-18 (5th Cir. 1990). As such, the Fifth Circuit concluded that criminal contempt proceedings are essentially unrelated to the underlying Title 11 proceedings in which they occur. Id. at 1518. Rather than
arising under Title 11, criminal contempt of bankruptcy court arises under 18
U.S.C. § 401. Id.; see infra note 101 (stating text of 18 U.S.C. § 401). Bankruptcy courts therefore lack core authority over criminal contempts. But see
Ragar,3 F.3d at 1179 (holding that criminal contempt serves an enforcement
function as well as a punitive function and therefore integrally relates to the
underlying Title 11 proceeding and provides a "necessary and appropriate"
means to enforce bankruptcy court orders).
In any event, bankruptcy court assertion of core criminal contempt authority would violate the Constitution. When acting in core capacity, bankruptcy
courts function as legislative courts. See supra notes 31 & 33 (discussing the
authority of bankruptcy courts over core matters). Legislative courts may only
conclusively determine matters of public right. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing legislative court authority over public rights). The
Supreme Court observed in Northern Pipeline that the public rights doctrine
does not extend to criminal matters. 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.24 (1982) (plurality); see
also Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1510-11. Therefore, the bankruptcy courts cannot consider criminal contempt in their legislative court capacity.
Importantly, none of these considerations applies to bankruptcy court civil
contempt authority. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (distinguishing criminal from civil contempt). Courts cite for civil contempt as a remedial measure to enforce their orders. See, e.g., Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia
Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). The parties in
interest in civil contempt are the contemnor and the party whom the contemnor
has harmed by her refusal to obey a court order in the underlying suit. Hipp,
895 F.2d at 1510. Courts therefore dismiss charges of civil contempt if they
dismiss the underlying suit. See id. at 1517-18 (comparing civil and criminal
contempt). Thus, civil contempt is integral to the underlying suit which gave
rise to the contempt in a way that criminal contempt is not. Finally, civil contempt, as the name implies, is not criminal.
These considerations have led some courts to hold bankruptcy courts have
core authority over civil contempt. Better Homes of Va., Inc. v. Budget Serv.
Co. (In re Better Homes of Va., Inc.), 52 B.R. 426,430 (E.D. Va. 1985), affd, 804
F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Depew, 51 B.R. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Tenn. 1985)
(same). Contra Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1289 (rejecting bankruptcy court core authority over civil contempt). For further discussion of the core status of contempt see Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,
448 (10th Cir. 1990).
58. See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy
court assertions of non-core authority to issue findings of criminal contempt).
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bankruptcy courts to use when conducting contempt proceedings
just in case they possess the necessary authority.5 9 The rule
provides that district courts subject proposed findings, at a
party's timely request, to de novo determination pursuant to
60
Bankruptcy Rule 9033 rather than to a full de novo hearing.
Still, the absence of express authority in the Bankruptcy Code to
issue proposed findings in contempt proceedings clouds certainty in interpretation. 6 ' Thus, the analogy between magistrate and bankruptcy judge authority to make proposed findings
is less compelling in the area of contempt law.

59. Bankruptcy Rule 9020 purports to govern the procedures whereby
bankruptcy courts may conduct contempt proceedings. Rule 9020(a) provides
that bankruptcy judges may summarily "determine" contempts committed in
their presence. Rule 9020(b) governs procedures for hearings on contempt committed outside the bankruptcy judge's presence. Rule 9020(c) controls the
mechanisms whereby a party may obtain district court review:
Service and effective date of order; review. The clerk shall serve forthwith a copy of the order of contempt on the entity named therein. The
order shall be effective 10 days after service of the order and shall have
the same force and effect as an order of contempt entered by the district court unless, within the 10 day period, the entity named therein
serves and files objections prepared in the manner provided in Rule
9033(b). If timely objections are fied, the order shall be reviewed as
provided in Rule 9033.
BANxR. R. 9020(c). Bankruptcy Rule 9033(d) provides for de novo review of appropriate portions of the record of bankruptcy court proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. See supra notes 39-40 (discussing Bankruptcy Rule
9033). Bankruptcy Rule 9020, therefore, essentially provides mechanisms for
bankruptcy courts to make proposed findings on contempt.
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1987 amendments of the Bankruptcy
Rules follow the text of Bankruptcy Rule 9020. They note that the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, see supra note 33 (discussing the 1978 Act), provided that bankruptcy courts were courts of law, equity, and admiralty. It also contains explicit
restrictions on bankruptcy court contempt power.
In contrast, the 1984 Amendments, see supra note 33 (discussing the 1984
amendments), provide that bankruptcy judges are judicial officers of the district
court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(a)1. The Amendments contain no explicit restrictions on bankruptcy court contempt power. The Advisory Committee recognized that these changes may well have robbed bankruptcy courts of statutory
contempt authority. The Committee wrote, "This rule [9020], as amended, recognizes that bankruptcy judges may not have the power to punish for contempt." BANKR. R. 9020 (advisory committee's note to 1987 amends.); see also
Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1518 (dismissing Bankruptcy Rule 9020 as a substantive
grant of contempt power); Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1288 (same).
60. See supra note 59 (stating text of Bankruptcy Rule 9020(c)).
61. See infra notes 115-134 and accompanying text (discussing the contrary conclusions on bankruptcy court criminal contempt authority reached by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits).
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CONSTITuTIONAL LIMITS ON DELEGATION OF CRMINAL
MATTERS TO NoN-ARTICLE III ADJUNCTS

Non-Article III tribunal power over criminal matters, such
as criminal contempt, raises difficult constitutional questions.
First, any such delegation of power raises the possibility that
the adjunct will encroach on the authority of Article III courts to
exercise the judicial power of the United States. 6 2 In addition,
with specific regard to de novo determinations, any procedure
that allows a judge to adjudicate guilt without actually hearing
the credibility-based evidence risks violating the defendant's
due process right to a hearing before the judge who determines
63
criminal liability.

1. Due Process Concerns
In United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court strongly
implied that resolution of criminal liability requires that the
judge who determines guilt hear the credibility-based evidence. 64 In Raddatz, a magistrate judge conducted a suppression hearing and issued appropriate proposed findings. 65 The
district judge reviewed the magistrate judge's findings under
the de novo determination standard, 6 6 confining his review to
Raddatz's written objections and the relevant portions of the record. 6 7 Raddatz argued on appeal that this review violated his
due process right that "[tlhe one who decides must hear [the
68
credibility-based evidence]."

The Court rejected this claim, noting that due process requirements are partially a function of the importance of the private interests at risk.6 9 The Court then reasoned that the
interests at stake in Raddatz's suppression hearing were less
62. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
63. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677-79 (1980) (discussing
the parameters of the due process right that the judge who decides an issue
must hear the credibility-based evidence on that issue).
64. Id. at 680 (holding that "de novo determination" as defined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) adequately protected the due process rights of the defendant who
sought review of a suppression hearing held in magistrate court).
65. Id. at 669-72.
66. Id. at 672.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 677 (citing Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)
(holding that "[tihe one who decides must hear")).
69. Id. at 677 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) for the
proposition that one factor to consider in weighing due process claims is "the
private interests implicated").
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important than those involved when a court decides criminal liability in a full-blown trial.7 0 Therefore, suppression hearings
merit less protection than hearings on criminal liability, and the
that "the one who decides must hear" does not
command
71
apply.
2. Article III Concerns
Non-Article III resolution of criminal matters poses the danger of usurping the Article III courts' control of the judicial
power. 72 Article III analysis proves difficult, however, because
of the Supreme Court's refusal to develop clear standards to determine when the delegation of power violates Article III. 73
Rather than apply "formalistic" tests, the Court "weigh[s] a
number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional
action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the fedjurisprudence has
eral judiciary."7 4 Unsurprisingly, Article III
75
grown into a very difficult area of the law.
Article III analysis hinges on both the personal rights of litigants and the structural integrity of the judicial branch.7 6 Regarding personal rights, the Court has observed that whether
defendants have a right to demand an Article III judge "at every
critical stage of a felony trial"77 constitutes a substantial constitutional question. The Court has avoided resolving this issue by
obeying the canon of constitutional avoidance, adopting reason70. Id. at 677-79.
71. Id. at 679-80. By implication, the command that the "one who decides
must hear" would apply in a hearing to decide guilt, when the defendant's interests are at their greatest. The Supreme Court bolstered this implication by citing with approval Lord Coleridge for the proposition that courts should not
conduct retrial on the basis of notes of the witnesses' prior testimony. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text (quoting the cited passage). The Court then
noted that Lord Coleridge made this remark while admonishing an appellate
court that had reviewed a trial on the merits based on mere written records.
447 U.S. at 679. The Supreme Court, therefore, presumably agrees that, for a
trial on the merits, the judge must hear the evidence.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 155-165 (discussing the structural
requirements of Article IM).
73. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852
(1986).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2669 (1991) (discussing
the personal right and structural integrity issues of Article III).
77. Id. at 2665.
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able statutory interpretations that enable it to avoid reaching
78
this constitutional issue.
Comparison of two recent Supreme Court cases highlights
the role of constitutional avoidance in Court jurisprudence. In
Gomez v. United States,7 9 the Court invalidated delegation without the defendant's consent 8 0 of felony voir dire to a magistrate
judge. Subsequently, in Peretz v. United States,8 1 the Court affirmed the delegation with the defendant's consent of felony voir
dire to a magistrate judge.8 2 The two cases reached different
statutory results due to the absence of Article III concerns in
Peretz.

3

In Gomez, the defendant's lack of consent raised the

difficult issue of whether the defendant had the right to demand
an Article III judge.8 4 To avoid this constitutional difficulty, the
Court interpreted the relevant statutes as denying magistrates
5
the authority to conduct non-consensual felony voir dire.
In Peretz, the Court did not need to practice constitutional
avoidance. Because a defendant may waive any right that may
exist to demand an Article III judge,8 6 Peretz's consent to magistrate voir dire obviated any need to resolve the existence of this
78. See, e.g., id.; Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (observing that "[it is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute
that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation
poses no constitutional question").
Constitutional avoidance is particularly apt when an Article Ill issue is at
stake. As Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked:
Particularly in an area of constitutional law such as that of "Article III
Courts," with its frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents, rigorous adherence to the principle that this Court should decide no more of a constitutional question than is absolutely necessary
accords with both our decided cases and with sound judicial policy.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Similar concerns led Justice Marshall to state, "[gliven the inherent complexity of Article III questions, the canon of constitutional avoidance should apply with peculiar force when an Article I issue is at stake." Peretz, 111 S. Ct.
at 2676 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
80. Id. at 872.
81. 111 S. Ct. 2661 (1991).
82. Id. at 2667.
83. See id. at 2669.
84. Id. at 2665 (stating that Gomez implicated the policy of constitutional
avoidance "because of the substantial question whether a defendant has a constitutional right to demand that an Article III judge preside at every critical
stage of a felony trial").
85. Id. at 2667.
86. See id. at 2669 (holding that a defendant has "no constitutional right to
have an Article III judge preside at jury selection if the defendant has raised no
objection to the judge's absence").
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right.8 7 The Court therefore felt free to interpret the relevant
statutes to permit magistrate judges to conduct felony voir dire
with the defendant's consent. s8 Read together, these cases indicate that the right to demand an Article III judge is sufficiently
robust that the Court will, when reasonably possible, interpret
the Court to avoid resolving
statutes in a manner that permits
89
this constitutional problem.
Article III analysis also involves structural concerns of separation-of-powers. 90 A grant of power to a non-Article III court
must not rob the Article III courts of their control of the judicial
power of the United States.9 1 In Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor9 2 and United States v. Raddatz, the Court
discussed factors it considers in assessing Article III challenges
which include: the degree to which the Article III courts retain
control over actions in the non-Article III courts, 93 the origin
and importance of litigants' rights at risk in the non-Article III
courts, 94 the extent to which the Article III courts retain exclu-

sive control of the "essential attributes" of the judicial power, 95
to delegate
and the importance of the concerns that led Congress
96
power to a non-Article III court in the first place.

Circuit courts have confronted structural Article III concerns when ruling on whether delegation of power to the magistrate judges violates Article III. Interestingly, a number of
87. Id. at 2667 (noting that "[t]he absence of any constitutional difficulty
removes one concern that motivated us in Gomez to require unambiguous evidence of Congress' intent to include jury selection among a magistrate's additional duties").
88. Id.
89. The Fifth Circuit provided a reasonable reading of the bankruptcy statutes that denies the bankruptcy courts criminal contempt power in In re Hipp,
895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fifth Circuifs analysis of the bankruptcy statutes and Congress's legislative intent).
90. See Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669.
91. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
850-52 (1986) (discussing the Article III requirement that grants of power to
non-Article III tribunals not encroach on the Article III courts' control of the
judicial power of the United States).
92. Id.
93. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685-86 (Blackmun, J., concurring), cited with approval in Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2669-70 (holding that Justice
Blackmun's concurring analysis inRaddatz on Article III courts' control of magistrate judges' actions governed Article III inquiry in Peretz regarding validity
of felony voir dire conducted by a magistrate judge with defendant consent).
94. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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circuit courts have stated that magistrate judges do not violate
Article III, in part because they lack all contempt power. 97 For
instance, the Seventh Circuit observed in Geras v. LaFayette
Display Fixtures,Inc.98 that exclusively vesting contempt power
in the Article III courts helps ensure the constitutionality of the
magistrate judges because it "provide[s] an adequate distinction
between such [Article III] judges and non-Article III officers." 9 9
D. A LITTLE CONTEMPT
Constitutional analysis of non-Article III tribunal authority
over contempt requires a brief introduction to this idiosyncratic
area of the law.' 0 0 Contempt, 10 1 broadly speaking, is an act of
97. See, e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044
(7th Cir. 1984) (noting that vesting the contempt power in Article III judges
distinguishes such judges from non-Article Ill officers such as magistrates);
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir.)
(observing that the Federal Magistrate Act preserves Article HI judicial power
by, among other things, denying contempt authority to magistrates), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
98. 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1044. In Geras, the Seventh Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which authorizes magistrate judges, with the consent
of the parties, to enter final judgment on civil matters and misdemeanors. The
court speculated that perhaps Article III analysis requires a clear line of demarcation between the authority of Article III judges and their adjuncts. It suggested that one could find this distinction in the magistrate judges' complete
inability to punish for contempt.
100. See supra note 6 (noting the complexity of contempt law); see generally
GOLDFARB, supra note 6 (providing an excellent discussion of the historical development of contempt law).
101. The federal courts punish contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401, which
reads as follows:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice; (2) Misbehavior of
any of its officers in their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42 establishes the procedures for punishment of criminal contempts. Rule 42(a) controls procedures for in-court contempts; Rule 42(b) controls procedures for out-of-court contempts:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constitut-

ing the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of
the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be
signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except
as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice.
The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essen-
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"disobedience or disrespect toward a judicial or legislative body
of government, or interference with its orderly process." 10 2 The
Supreme Court characterizes contempt authority as an "inherent power" of the courts. 10 3 The justification for this inherent
power lies in separation-of-powers.' 0 4 Without it, the courts
would have to rely on the other branches of government to enwith the idea
force their will. This subordinacy is incompatible
10 5
of coequal branches in a tripartite government.
Contempts may be either criminal or civil.' 0 6 The distinction between the two rests on the ostensible purpose for which
the court sanctions the contemnor.' 0 7 A court cites for civil contempt for the benefit of a complainant whom the contemnor has
hurt by refusal to obey a court order.' 0 8 By contrast, courts cite
tial facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as
such.... The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in
which an act of Congress so provides.... Upon a verdict or finding of
guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42. Thus, a "court of the United States" may punish in-court
contempts (that the judge witnesses) summarily. Courts must grant hearings
for determinations of out-of-court contempt. Hence, out-of-court contempt is
sometimes referred to as "nonsummary" contempt.
102. GOLDFARB, supra note 6 at 1. The courts' formal power to punish for
contempt reaches back in time to medieval England. Id. at 9. The judges were
agents of the king. To disobey them was to disobey the king. Id. at 11. It was
not a good idea to disobey the king. In the United States, courts do not have the
option of justifying their contempt power as a function of kingly sovereignty.
103. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel Chicago, St. P., M., & O.R.
Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (holding that "the power to punish for contempts
... has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.... The
courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become possessed of the power").
104. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.
787, 796 (1987) (holding that "[t]he ability to punish disobedience to judicial
orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to
vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches").
105. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450
(1911) (holding that without the contempt power "what the Constitution... fittingly calls the 5udicial power of the United States' would be a mere mockery").
106. See, e.g., id. at 441 (discussing distinctions between civil and criminal
contempt); Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281,
1283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
107. See, e.g., Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose
that often serve to distinguish the two classes of [contempt] cases. If it
is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of
the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.
Id.
108. Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1283 n.1 (holding that "[c]ivil contempt is a refusal to do an act the court has ordered for the benefit of a party; the sentence is
remedial").
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for criminal contempt for punitive rather than remedial reasons. 10 9 The court's purpose in passing a judgment of criminal
contempt is to vindicate its authority by punishing the
contemnor. 110
Criminal contempt is not a crime in the usual sense of
transgression of a positive law. Rather, the criminal contemnor
has in some way interfered with or shown disrespect for the
court."1 As a result, despite the obvious dangers that criminal
contempt poses to liberty and property, courts were for many
years reluctant to grant alleged criminal contemnors the same
11 2
procedural protections as their "law"-breaking counterparts.
This is no longer the case. Courts now regard criminal contempt
13 for purposes of determining
as a "crime in the ordinary sense"1114
rights.
procedural
the defendant's

109. Id. (holding that "[ciriminal contempt is a completed act of disobedience; the sentence is punitive to vindicate the authority of the court"); see also
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 445 (holding that criminal contempts that arise even in
civil litigation are controversies between the state and the defendant, not between the parties of the underlying suit).
110. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
111. See supra note 101 (stating the text of 18 U.S.C. § 401).
112. Historically, criminal contemnors did not merit much in the way of procedural protections from the danger of arbitrary courts. For instance, criminal
contemnors were not entitled to a jury trial. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95
(1895); cf. GOLDFARB, supra note 6, at 168-84 (criticizing the historical lack of
protections for a criminal conteinnor).
113. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
114. Nonetheless, courts face a practical difficulty in determining what procedures to accord criminal contemnors. Typically, one determines whether a
crime is a misdemeanor or felony (and the procedural protections the defendant
merits) on the basis of the maximum authorized penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(1988) (classifying crimes according to the maximum term of imprisonment that
a court may impose; a crime is a felony if punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year). The punishment for criminal contempts sometimes has no statutory maximum. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 206 n.8. The Supreme Court has ruled,
therefore, that the seriousness of the contempt (for purposes of the felony/misdemeanor distinction) depends not on the (often nonexistent) statutory maximum penalty but rather on the penalty which the court actually imposes. Id. at
211 (holding that when "the legislature has not expressed a judgment as to the
seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty... [courts are] to look to
the penalty actually imposed" to determine the seriousness of the offense). Theoretically, punishment for the criminal contempt should depend on the evidence
of the crime that the prosecution presents during the proceeding (i.e., let the
punishment fit the crime). Courts dealing with a criminal contempt may therefore face the administrative difficulty of not knowing in advance whether they
are dealing with a felony or a misdemeanor for purposes of deciding the procedural protections to afford the defendant.
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II. IN RE HIPPAND IN RE RAGAR: TWO CONTRASTING
APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF BANKRUPTCY
COURT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Two recent appellate decisions, In re Hipp"1 5 and In re
Ragar 16 illustrate the difficulty of determining whether bankruptcy court issuance of proposed findings of criminal contempt
violates the rights of alleged contemnors. The bankruptcy
courts in both In re Hipp11 7 and In re Ragar1 15 regarded crimi115. Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990).
116. Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174 (8th Cir. 1993).
117. 895 F.2d at 1503 (criticizing an unpublished bankruptcy proposed finding of criminal contempt). On April 5, 1988, the bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to convict the defendant, David Oles, of
criminal contempt for violating a November 9, 1987 order of the bankruptcy
court commanding him not to interfere with the sale of property of the bankruptcy estate of Hipp, Inc. Id. at 1505-06. The bankruptcy court found Oles
guilty of five counts of "willful contempt." Id. at 1506 & n.8. The court sentenced him to six months confinement and a $500 fine for each count-the
terms of confinement to run concurrently and the fines to accumulate for a total
of $2500. Id. The bankruptcy court entered a written order on April 8 formalizing its oral findings at the April 5 hearing. At no time in either the oral finding
or the written order did the court refer to the need to find the defendant guilty
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Oles filed timely objections to the bankruptcy court's order pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 9020. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1506. The district court reviewed the
order pursuant to Rule 9033 under the "de novo determination" standard solely
on the basis of the written record, the transcript of the contempt hearing, and
Oles's written objections. The court declined to take any more evidence on the
matter or to grant any further hearing. Id. On August 26, 1988, the district
court filed an opinion and order affirming the bankruptcy court's "findings of
fact and conclusions of law" that Oles had committed criminal contempt. Id. at
1504. It vacated the fines but upheld the term of confinement. Id. at 1504 n.4.
118. 140 B.R. 889, 891 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992), appeal decided by 3 F.3d
1174 (8th Cir. 1993). The bankruptcy court disqualified an attorney, Brown,
from representing Christine Ragar in bankruptcy reorganization. Id. at 889-90.
Brown continued to represent Ragar and filed pleadings on her behalf. Id. at
890. The bankruptcy court ordered Brown to show cause why the court should
not find him in civil or criminal contempt. Id. The court held a hearing, found
Brown in criminal contempt, and fined him $950. Id. at 890-91. It ruled that
its order would become final ten days after service on Brown unless he were to
file written objections within that period. Id. at 891. Brown filed the necessary
objections. The district court then reviewed the order and objections de novo as
provided by Bankruptcy Rule 9033(b). Ragar,3 F.3d at 1177. The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's proposed finding that Brown had been in criminal contempt. Id.; Ragar,3 F.3d at 1176-77.
Brown appealed the contempt to the circuit court. He argued, among other
things, that bankruptcy courts have no statutory criminal contempt power. Id.
at 1177. Furthermore, he argued that any such authorization would unconstitutionally usurp of Article III judicial power. Id.
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nal contempt as falling under their non-core authority. 119 In
both cases, the courts dealt with the contempts in a non-summary fashion, granting hearings. 120 After the hearings, both
courts filed proposed findings that the defendants had commit12 1
ted criminal contempt.
On appeal to their respective circuits, Hipp and Ragar
reached diametrically opposed results. As a statutory matter,
the Eighth Circuit held in Ragar that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to make recommendations of contempt to enforce Title 11.122 In pertinent part, § 105(a) states
that a bankruptcy court "may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title." 12 3 The court ruled that the "plain meaning of the
statute" clearly authorizes the bankruptcy court's proposed finding, which is a "necessary or appropriate" means to enforce the

provisions of Title

11.124

The Eighth Circuit shrugged off any constitutional arguments with the observation that, in making a proposed finding
of criminal contempt, the bankruptcy court had acted precisely
as a magistrate judge acts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.125 Because analogous magistrate action has long survived constitutional attack, the court reasoned that the bankruptcy court's
12 6
action was clearly constitutional.
The Fifth Circuit in Hipp found the language of the bankruptcy statutes ambiguous and resorted to statutory history and
legislative intent. 2 7 The court concluded that Congress did not
119. In both cases, the bankruptcy judges filed contempt orders that provided for district court review pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9033. See supra
note 40 (stating BANKR. R. 9033(d)). District courts use Rule 9033 to review
bankruptcy court proposed findings that they make pursuant to non-core authority. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988). Therefore, in both Hipp and Ragar, the
bankruptcy judges treated contempt proceedings as falling under their non-core
authority. Ragar,3 F.3d at 1178 & n.3 (noting that the bankruptcy court below
had treated criminal contempt as a non-core matter); Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1504
(noting that the bankruptcy court below had made "a proposed finding of fact
and conclusion of law" on criminal contempt).
120. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1505; Ragar,3 F.3d at 1177.
121. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1506; Ragar, 3 F.3d at 1177.
122. Ragar,3 F.3d at 1178-79.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
124. Ragar,3 F.3d at 1178-79.
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id.
127. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1515-18 (noting that the current bankruptcy statutes
make no explicit mention of contempt power and then proceeding to analyze
legislative history and intent).
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statutorily authorize bankruptcy courts to issue findings on nonsummary criminal contempt. 12 8 The court observed that courts
128. Id. at 1519. The circuit court posited that only two provisions of the
1984 Act could conceivably serve as statutory grants of bankruptcy court contempt power-li U.S.C. § 105 and 28 U.S.C. § 157. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1515-17.
The court held that neither provision grants criminal contempt power.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) grants the bankruptcy courts the authority to issue "any
order, process, or judgment necessary or appropriate" to enforce Title 11. See
supra text accompanying note 123 (stating pertinent part of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).
The Fifth Circuit observed that courts use criminal contempt to punish contemnors, not to enforce orders. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1515. Courts use civil contempt, by contrast, as a remedial measure to enforce court orders. Id. Criminal
contempt, therefore, is not "necessary" to enforce bankruptcy court orders. Id.
at 1516. As such, § 105(a) does not authorize bankruptcy courts to issue nonsummary criminal contempts. Id.
The court also rejected 28 U.S.C. § 157 as a statutory source of criminal
contempt power. Id. at 1517-18. Section 157 sets forth the bankruptcy courts'
core and non-core authority. See supra notes 31 & 35 (stating pertinent portions of the statute). A bankruptcy court may assert core authority over proceedings under Title 11, arising under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title
11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988); Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1517. It may assert non-core
authority over proceedings that are "related" to a case under Title 11. 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c) (1988).
A court may continue a proceeding to punish criminal contempt even after
the termination of the underlying proceeding in which the contempt occurred.
Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1518; see supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (discussing criminal and civil contempt). The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded
that, because criminal contempt is a "separate and independent proceeding"
from the proceeding in which it occurred, criminal contempt of bankruptcy
court "is not itself a 'core' proceeding or a case under [tlitle 11." Hipp, 895 F.2d
at 1518.
The Fifth Circuit also stated that, because criminal contempt proceedings
may commence or continue even after resolution of an underlying case, criminal
contempt proceedings may have no Title 11 case with which to "relate." Id.
Thus, criminal contempt does not "relate" to an underlying bankruptcy court
proceeding merely because the contempt consisted of violation of a bankruptcy
court order. Id. As such, the court reasoned that bankruptcy courts lack noncore authority over nonsummary criminal contempt. Id.
The court buttressed its statutory analysis with a review of the legislative
history of the 1984 Act. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1517-18; see supra note 30. Congress
designed the 1984 Act to deal with the constitutional infirmities of the 1978
Act. Id. at 1517; see supra note 33 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in
Northern Pipeline). The 1978 Act had, among other things, granted a restricted
contempt power to the bankruptcy courts. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1516 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1481 (repealed) in the 1978 Act as a grant of limited contempt power to
the bankruptcy courts). The 1984 Act does not explicitly grant contempt powers. Id. at 1518. If the bankruptcy court contempt power continues to exist
under the 1984 Act, then Congress granted it implicitly and without limits. Id.
Congress intended the 1984 Act to limit bankruptcy court jurisdiction to prevent them from usurping Article III judicial power. Id. at 1517. In light of this
purpose, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress could not have intended in the
1984 Act to replace the 1978 Act's explicit but limited grant of contempt power
with an implicit, unlimited grant of contempt power. Id. at 1518; see supranote
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use criminal contempt to punish contemnors rather than to enforce orders. 12 9 Therefore, the court concluded, in direct opposition to the Eighth Circuit's holding in Ragar, that the
enforcement provisions of § 105(a) do not authorize bankruptcy
court findings of criminal contempt. 130
Although the Hipp court resolved the case on statutory
grounds, it noted that granting criminal contempt power to nonArticle III officers raises serious constitutional problems. 1 31 The
court observed that some circuit courts have stated that magistrate judges do not violate Article III in part because they lack
contempt power. 132 To the extent that bankruptcy courts making proposed findings on non-core matters act like magistrate
judges, the same analysis should apply. 133 Furthermore, the
court stated its concern that the de novo determination standard
permits district courts to violate the due process requirement
that, in adjudication of criminal liability, the "one who decides
must hear."13 4 In sum, the Ragar court held that bankruptcy
statutes constitutionally grant the bankruptcy courts the authority to issue proposed findings of criminal contempt; the Hipp
court, motivated in part by constitutional avoidance, concluded
that bankruptcy statutes do not authorize such findings.
III. BANKRUPTCY COURT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION
Bankruptcy court proposed findings of criminal contempt
create very difficult constitutional problems. Fortunately, Congress can easily fix these problems by requiring bankruptcy
judges who wish to initiate criminal contempt proceedings to follow the same procedures that magistrate judges must follow to
33 (discussing further the statutory history of the bankruptcy courts' 1978 and
1984 reorganizations in light of NorthernPipeline).
129. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1515 (distinguishing the punitive nature of criminal
contempt from the remedial nature of civil contempt).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1509-11.
132. Id. at 1511 n.16 (citing cases).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38, 48-52 (discussing bankruptcy court non-core authority and magistrate judge authority to issue findings on dispositive pretrial motions).
134. Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1519-20 (noting that de novo review pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 9033(d) permits district courts to confine review to written
documents in violation of the due process requirement that "the one who decides must hear"); see supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing
Raddatz).
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initiate any contempt proceeding. Like magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges can avoid constitutional problems by certifying the
facts of criminal contempt for district court hearing rather than
making proposed findings of guilt for district court review.

A. DUE

PROCESS AND ARTICLE III PROBLEMS OF BANKRuPrcY
COURT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

District court "de novo determination" review based solely
on written records of a bankruptcy court's proposed findings of
criminal contempt violates the defendant's constitutional right
to due process. Moreover, granting bankruptcy courts power to
make preliminary findings of criminal liability in nonconsensual
hearings may violate Article III. At the very least, exercise of
this power implicates such serious Article III problems that the
courts should follow the Fifth Circuit's example and favor a reasonable statutory reading that denies this authority to the bankruptcy courts. 13 5

1. The False Analogy Between Current Bankruptcy and
Magistrate Procedures for Criminal Contempt
As a preliminary matter, one can discard the notion that
bankruptcy judges, in making proposed findings on criminal
contempt, merely act as magistrate judges pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 and that therefore these actions are clearly constitutional. 136 When bankruptcy courts make proposed findings concerning non-core issues, they behave like magistrate judges
acting pursuant to § 636(b).' 37 This section governs the magistrate judges' authority over dispositive pretrial matters. In contrast, when a magistrate judge initiates contempt proceedings,
he or she must act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e).13 8 The magistrate13judge
certifies facts for an entirely fresh district court hearing. 9 This review differs from that of magistrate action
pursuant to § 636(b) which requires only de novo determination
135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's statutory analysis of the bankruptcy statutes).
136. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (comparing bankruptcy
and magistrate statutory authority to issue findings of contempt).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (comparing the bankruptcy
court authority to issue proposed findings on non-core issues with magistrate
court authority to issue proposed findings on dispositive pretrial motions).
138. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing magistrate
authority to certify facts of contempt for district court de novo hearing).
139. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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without a hearing. 140 Therefore, bankruptcy court proposed
findings of contempt are not constitutional merely because magistrate action pursuant to § 636 has survived constitutional
scrutiny. Because the standards of review for contempt in the
two contexts differ, one should not compare the bankruptcy
find14 1
ing apple to the magistrate certification orange.
2.

Due Process Concerns

De novo determination of criminal contempt confined to review of written documents violates the due process rights of defendants. The Supreme Court in Raddatz held that suppression
hearings do not merit the full procedural protections that determinations of criminal liability require. 14 2 Therefore, unlike determinations of guilt, suppression hearings do not require that
the "one who decides must hear."143 By implication, due process
requires that the one who decides guilt actually hear the credibility-based evidence of guilt. 144 To the degree that the district
court reviews a finding of criminal contempt on the basis of the
written records alone, it decides issues that it has not heard.
145
Thus, the court violates due process.
3.

Article III: Personal and Structural Concerns

Bankruptcy court proposed findings of criminal contempt
may run afoul of both the personal rights that Article III grants
defendants and the structural requirements that Article III requires to preserve the integrity of the judicial branch. Regarding personal Article III concerns, whether a defendant possesses
140. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that courts may confine de novo determination to review of written records).
141. Indeed, the fact that magistrate judges must obey procedures requiring
that district courts hear all the evidence of contempt augurs against the constitutionality of allowing bankruptcy courts to make proposed findings of contempt subject to less severe scrutiny. A number of circuit courts have observed
that the absence of magistrate contempt power is one reason why magistrates
do not violate Article I as adjuncts of the district courts. See supra note 97
(listing cases). To the degree this observation is persuasive, one should apply it
to bankruptcy courts acting in their adjunct capacity.
142. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Raddatz holding on due process).
143. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936) (holding that
"Wthe one who decides must hear").
144. Id.
145. See Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1520 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating the court's concern that de novo review confined to written
records of a finding of criminal contempt may violate the due process requirement expressed in Raddatz that the decision maker hear the evidence).
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the right to demand an Article III judge for every critical stage
146
of a felony trial poses a "substantial constitutional question."
When a bankruptcy court conducts a nonconsenual hearing on a
serious criminal contempt charge, it risks violating this possible
right. 147
The fact that the bankruptcy court makes a preliminary
"proposed finding" rather than a conclusive determination of
guilt does not render the hearing "non-critical" for Article III
purposes. In Gomez, the defendant had the opportunity to demand de novo determination review of the felony voir dire conducted by the magistrate judge. 48 Despite the preliminary
status of the voir dire the Court held that the voir dire implicated the issue of whether Gomez had the right to demand an
14 9
Article III judge during any critical stage of a felony trial.
Proposed findings, therefore, may be critical despite their preliminary status.
When a bankruptcy court conducts a criminal contempt
hearing, it controls a far more critical stage than preliminary
felony voir dire-a decision on actual guilt. 150 If a preliminary
voir dire implicates the right to demand an Article III judge,
then surely a preliminary determination of guilt must also im146. See supra text accompanying note 77.
147. The idiosyncratic nature of contempt enhances this risk because a
bankruptcy court may not know in advance whether it is making a proposed
finding on a felony or misdemeanor criminal contempt. See supra note 114 (discussing the uncertainties a bankruptcy court faces when hearing a contempt
charge).
148. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 861 (1989).
149. The Gomez court specified two reasons for regarding magistrate findings on felony voir dire as critical. First, felony voir dire is the jurors' "first
introduction to the substantive factual and legal issues in a case." Gomez, 490
U.S. at 874. Felony voir dire is therefore obviously intrinsically important.
Second, voir dire requires great attention to juror demeanor. Practically speaking, a judge cannot effectively review magistrate judge voir dire. Id. at 875.
Peretz also indicates that voir dire is a critical stage. The Court noted that
if the right to demand an Article III judge exists, the defendant can waive it.
111 S.Ct. at 2669. See supra text accompanying note 86. Therefore, Peretz's
consent to the magistrate judge conducting felony voir dire obviated the constitutional question. If felony voir dire were not a critical stage of a felony trial,
the Court would not have needed to rely on defendant consent to avoid the constitutional question. It could have dismissed Peretz's appeal by holding that
voir dire is not critical. The Court's choice to rely on Peretz's waiver indicates
that felony voir dire did in fact raise the constitutional question. As such, felony voir dire is a critical stage of a felony trial.
150. See, e.g., Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1521 (5th Cir.
1990) ("[S]urely no stage [of a criminal trial] is more critical than that of the live
presentation and receipt of the evidence. . .).
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plicate this potential right, at least whenever a bankruptcy
51 criminal contempts. 15 2
court purports to decide felony-level
Of course, the Supreme Court has not definitively held that
defendants have a personal right to demand an Article III judge
at every critical stage of a felony trial. It has merely held that
the existence of this right is a "substantial constitutional question."15 3 In Gomez, however, the Court demonstrated that it will
adopt reasonable readings of statutes to avoid unnecessary final
resolution of the parameters of this right. Therefore, bankruptcy court proposed findings of serious criminal contempt are
either unconstitutional if the right to demand an Article III
judge exists, or, at the very least, sufficiently controversial that
the Supreme Court would adopt a reasonable reading of the relevant bankruptcy statutes that denies bankruptcy courts this
154
authority.
Bankruptcy court proposed findings of criminal contempt
also implicate Article IIrs structural concerns. 15 5 Structural requirements exist not for the defendant's benefit but to maintain
the integrity of the judicial branch. 15 6 In decisions upholding a
grant of power to a non-Article III court, the Supreme Court has
focused on the degree to which Article III courts maintain control over actions in the non-Article III tribunal 5 7 In his Raddatz concurrence, Justice Blackmun specifically mentioned the
power of district courts to decline to refer matters to magistrate
151. Adding to the procedural confusion, bankruptcy courts will not know
before sentencing whether a relatively serious contempt is a misdemeanor or a
felony. See supra note 114 (discussing the proposition that a contempt's status
as a felony or misdemeanor depends on the sentence a court imposes for the
offense).
152. See Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1520-21 (observing in the context of an appeal of
a bankruptcy court's finding of criminal contempt that live presentation of the
evidence of guilt is a critical stage of a trial and that the defendant has the right
to a hearing before the 'judicial officer having jurisdiction to render the judgment of acquittal or conviction and sentence").
153. See supra text accompanying note 77.
154. See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1518 (reading the bankruptcy statutes as
denying contempt authority over nonsummary criminal contempts); Plastiras v.
Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that bankruptcy courts lack statutory civil contempt authority).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96 (discussing Article III structural concerns).
156. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51

(1986).
157. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685-86 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), cited with approval in Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661,
2670 (1991) (noting the role of district court supervisory control in constitutionalizing the magistrate courts).
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judges as one important aspect of the Article III control that renders magistrate judges constitutional. 158 This form of control is
notably absent when bankruptcy judges make proposed findings
of criminal contempt because criminal contempts would arise in
cases that the district court has already referred to the bankruptcy court.
Moreover, in Schor, the Supreme Court mentioned the "importance of the right to be adjudicated" as another factor to
weigh in determining the validity of delegation of power to nonArticle III courts.' 5 9 Raddatz taught that defendants merit
maximum procedural rights during adjudication of guilt because
the personal interests at stake are at their greatest. 60 Thus,
the rights at stake in hearings on criminal liability are more important than those at stake in a suppression hearing, as in Rad16 1
datz, or felony voir dire, as in Peretz and Gomez.
The Schor Court also held that to assess the constitutionality of a grant of power to a non-Article III tribunal, courts should
focus on "the extent to which the 'essential attributes of the judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts."16 2 If the power to conduct a nonconsensual hearing that
decides criminal liability is not an "essential attribute" of the
judicial power, it is difficult to imagine what is. Congress placed
strict consent requirements on magistrate civil and misdemeanor trials precisely to ensure that the magistrate system
63
would not usurp this critical power from the Article III courts.'
Granting bankruptcy courts the power to conduct preliminary
hearings for crimes that can merit felony-level punishment
clearly constitutes a serious assertion of a significant, traditional judicial power.
158. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring), cited with approval in Peretz, 111 S. Ct. at 2661, 2670.
159. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851; see supra note 94 and accompanying text (stating a portion of the Schor holding).
160. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851; see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the Raddatz majority's approach to due process).
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (comparing the importance of
rights implicated in a suppression hearing to those in a determination of guilt);
Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1520-21 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that the interests at stake in an evidentiary hearing on guilt exceed
those in a suppression hearing).
162. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988) (placing strict consent requirements on
the magistrate judges' authority to conduct civil and misdemeanor trials).
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No overarching conceptual scheme controls Article III jurisprudence.1 6 4 The Supreme Court renders its Article III decisions based on a complex weighing process in which no single
factor is determinative. 1 65 Therefore, it is difficult to predict
with confidence how the Court will rule on issues of delegation of
power to non-Article III officers. When bankruptcy courts conduct nonconsensual hearings on criminal contempt, however,
they seek to exercise greater powers with less Article HI supervision over more important rights than those grants of power
the Supreme Court upheld in cases such as Raddatz and Peretz.
Thus, as bankruptcy court proposed findings on criminal contempt go beyond the pale of prior Supreme Court approval of
non-Article III power, the exercise of this power likely violates
Article IIrs structural requirements.
Circuit court observations on the constitutional importance
of magistrate judges' lack of contempt power confirm this line of
reasoning. 16 6 In Geras, the Seventh Circuit wrote that some
line of demarcation might be necessary to distinguish Article III
from adjunct authority.167 It suggested that the magistrate
168
judges' utter lack of contempt authority served this purpose.
This observation makes a great deal of sense in light of Article
IIrs structural concerns. The court clearly viewed the contempt
power to independently enforce judgements as an "essential attribute of the judicial power."16 9 Thus, denying this power to
the magistrate judges prevents adjunct encroachment on Article
III judicial power. Application of this reasoning to the context of
bankruptcy judges acting in their adjunct capacity7 0indicates
that they, too, should lack criminal contempt power.'
In sum, granting bankruptcy courts the power to conduct
nonconsensual hearings to make preliminary determinations of
criminal contempt risks violating the due process right to a
164. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.

165. Id.
166. See supra note 97 (citing cases that note the importance of the magistrate judges' lack of contempt power).
167. 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); see supra note 99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Geras court's observations on contempt).
168. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
169. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (citing the Schor holding for
the proposition that the degree to which delegation robs the Article HI courts of
their "essential attributes of judicial power" is one factor in weighing Article H
challenges).
170. See Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d 1503, 1511 n.16 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting the significance of circuit court observations on the magistrate
judges' lack of contempt power in discussion of the constitutionality of bankruptcy court contempt authority).
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hearing before the judge who determines guilt, the potential
right to demand an Article III judge at every critical stage of a
felony trial, and the Article III courts' control of the judicial
power of the United States.

B. A

MODEST PROPOSAL

Fortunately, Congress can easily mandate effective procedures that will eliminate constitutional concerns and will clarify
the bankruptcy courts' authority to initiate criminal contempt
proceedings. Congress 17 1 should require bankruptcy judges,
like their magistrate judge colleagues acting pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(e), to certify facts of criminal 72 contempt for de
novo hearing at the district court level. 17 3 The bankruptcy
courts would have the authority to notify the district judges that
a person may have committed criminal contempt. 1 74 The district judge would conduct a de novo hearing on all the relevant
evidence to determine guilt.
171. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could adopt a new Bankruptcy Rule
9020 that similarly limits and clarifies bankruptcy court criminal contempt authority. Cf supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the current Bankruptcy Rule 9020). Finally, appellate courts could achieve the same end simply
by holding that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to conduct criminal contempt hearings. See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1509.
172. This Note does not analyze the bankruptcy courts' civil contempt authority. Civil contempt authority is also controversial. See, e.g., Plastiras v.
Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that bankruptcy courts lack the power to issue final orders of civil contempt). Nonetheless, a number of courts have held that civil contempt falls
under the bankruptcy courts' authority. See supra note 4 (noting decisions on
bankruptcy court civil contempt power). For general discussions of bankruptcy
court civil contempt power see, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 8; Howard, supra
note 8 (discussing both civil and criminal contempt authority); Sogn, supranote
8.
Therefore, even if courts or Congress were to decide that bankruptcy courts
may only certify facts of criminal contempt, bankruptcy courts may still enjoy
authority to issue findings or orders of civil contempt. This would enable the
bankruptcy courts to enforce their orders efficiently but deprive them of the
power to punish crime. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (comparing the remedial and punitive natures of civil and criminal contempt).
Thus, depriving bankruptcy courts of criminal contempt power need not render
them toothless.
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1988) (granting magistrate judges authority to
certify facts for contempt); see supra note 53 (quoting pertinent part of 28
U.S.C. § 636(e)). For a discussion that concludes that bankruptcy courts should
certify facts of contempt, see Parkinson, supra note 8, at 618, 622.
174. See, e.g., Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., 954 F.2d 888, 903 (3d Cir.
1992) (describing magistrate judge certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 636(e)
as serving a "notification" function).
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This solution eliminates any Article III danger. No personal
Article IIH rights of defendants are at risk because the bankruptcy judge would not conduct any sort of hearing purporting to
decide guilt. Therefore, certification does not implicate any
right to demand an Article HI judge at a critical stage of a trial.
In addition, no structural Article III interests are at risk because the bankruptcy court certification would only serve to notify the district court of a possible crime-not exactly a huge
usurpation of traditional judicial functions.
This procedure also would lay due process concerns to rest.
As under the current system, the district judge would formally
determine guilt. The proposal simply guarantees that the district judge would hear all the credibility-based evidence necessary for this determination. This procedure therefore satisfies
the due process requirement that the one who hears the evidence determines the guilt.
Two primary objections to this proposal come to mind.
First, refusing bankruptcy judges the authority to conduct hearings on criminal contempt would waste judicial resources by requiring more hearings before district judges. Unfortunately,
this may be true. Viewing the judicial system as a whole, however, the proposal might, in some respects, enhance judicial
economy. Confusion in the current system has led some bankruptcy judges to conduct hearings on criminal contempt. Due
process demands that a hearing also take place before the adjudicator who formally determines guilt, the district judge.1 75 The
current system therefore allows, or at least does not clearly prevent, two hearings on the criminal contempt charge-in bankruptcy court and district court. By clarifying bankruptcy judges'
lack of criminal contempt authority, this proposal at least enjoys
the merit of ensuring that only one hearing takes place.
A second objection is that the proposal would encourage contempt of the bankruptcy courts' authority by reducing the threat
of sanctions for contemptuous behavior.' 7 6 The magistrate
175. See supra note 71 and text accompanying notes 142-145 (discussing the
due process requirement that the judge who decides guilt hear the evidence).
176. Of course, the mere fact that bankruptcy courts might find it useful to
possess criminal contempt power does not, in itself, justify bankruptcy court
contempt authority. As a matter of first principles, the justification for the contempt power lies in separation-of-powers. See supra text accompanying note
104 (discussing the justification for inherent contempt power). The Article III
courts need an independent means to enforce their will to maintain the integrity of the judiciary in three-branch government. This rationale does not apply
to the bankruptcy courts for the simple reason that they are not Article III
courts. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Courts have described con-
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courts, however, perform quite well without either independent
civil or criminal contempt authority. 1 77 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recently noted that magistrate courts play an "integral and important role in the federal judicial system."178 Their
importance to the federal judiciary contradicts the idea that lack
of contempt authority has crippled the magistrate courts. If the
magistrate judges can make do without civil or criminal contempt power, then presumably bankruptcy judges can dispense
with pretensions to criminal 7 9 contempt power.
CONCLUSION
Criminal contempts are crimes in "the ordinary sense" that
merit Article III and due process protections. Currently, district
courts using the "de novo determination" standard may review
bankruptcy court proposed findings of contempt entirely on the
basis of written records. Review confined to written records violates the due process requirement that the one who decides guilt
must hear the evidence. Furthermore, these findings may well
violate Article III or, at the very least, raise troubling Article III
questions. The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the statutory history of
bankruptcy court contempt authority reasonably argues that
Congress did not intend to grant the bankruptcy courts criminal
contempt powers. Therefore, in the alternative, the "settled doctrine" of constitutional avoidance, a doctrine which applies with
"peculiar force" on issues of Article III, dictates that courts
should conclude that bankruptcy courts lack the statutory authority to issue proposed findings of criminal contempt. Instead
of making these constitutionally dubious findings, bankruptcy
courts should merely certify the facts of contempt for district
court de novo hearing. This procedure avoids constitutional
problems and has proven adequate in the magistrate system.

tempt as an "awesome power." See, e.g., Sequoia, 827 F.2d at 1285. The Article
III courts should carefully reserve to themselves this power to punish. Like
their magistrate judge colleagues, bankruptcy courts may and should rely on
the Article III courts to grant appropriate remedies for criminal contempt.
177. The Supreme Court recently observed that the magistrate system is
flourishing and that magistrate judges account for a "staggering" amount ofjudicial work. Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2665 n.5 (1991) (citing
Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (1989)).
178. Id.
179. Again, this Note leaves open the possibility of whether bankruptcy
courts possess civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt authority. See supra
notes 4, 57, 172 (citing discussions of the civil contempt power).

